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The Rise and Fall of the U.N. Charter's
Use of Force Rules
By MICHAEL J. GLENNON*
Thank you very much, Dean Martinez, for that very kind
introduction. It is a great honor to be here today to give the first
Rudolf B. Schlesinger Memorial Lecture.
As the plane landed last night at the airport, I was mentally
transported back to 1977-my first visit to San Francisco, when I
came out here for a meeting of the American society of International
Law with two members of the NYU law faculty, Tom Franck and
Andy Lowenfeld. As the plane landed at the airport in 1977, I
remember Andy gazing out the window, looking back at Tom and me
and saying, "This place could cause a person to lose all ambition."
Well, Boston is a city of many charms, but no one has ever
accused Boston of causing a person to lose all ambition. This is the
first time I have been back to California since accepting my current
post at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and it is really a
great honor to be here. I could not think of a better reason to return
to California than to be here with you today.
Several years ago, during the run up to the war in Kosovo, the
story is told that Secretary of State Albright received a telephone call
from her opposite number, British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook.
Cook reportedly advised Secretary Albright that he had "problems
with our lawyers." The lawyers to the British Foreign Ministry
apparently had advised him that NATO needed the approval of the
U.N. Security Council before commencing the bombing of
Yugoslavia. Secretary Albright famously responded, "Robin, get new
lawyers."
I suppose one could speculate as to what motivated our Secretary
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Professor Glennon gave
the Inaugural Rudolf B. Schlesinger Memorial Lecture on International and
Comparative Law at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law on
Thursday, February 12, 2004.
*
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of State to make that response. One possibility is that she thought the
lawyers to the British Foreign Office were simply wrong, and that the
American lawyers, upon whose advice she was apparently relying,
were correct. Another possibility-more likely, I believe-is that she,
like many American policy makers, had come to believe that
international lawyers subsist in a strange parallel universe like a kind
of religious cult, an "invisible college" engaged in analysis altogether
removed from that of policy makers in the other half of that universe.
I want to explore today the question of how this parallel universe
came into existence. Why is it that policy makers sit, in effect, in one
room and decide whether to use force based upon its costs and
benefits, and international lawyers sit in another room and engage in
legal analysis which is all too often removed from the decisions made
by the policy makers? I want to explore this question by examining
three different elements of American foreign policy: first, its
objectives; second, the means by which American foreign policy
objectives are pursued-specifically the extent to which the United
States uses and should use international institutions, looking at
international organizations and rules governing the use of force; and
third, to say a final word about how, in my view, the United States
should deal with a world in which the U.N. collective security system
has all but collapsed.
First, it is often said that the United States has no foreign policy,
that it is all ad hoc, all improvisation. I believe that is incorrect. In
my view, the United States has a simple and quite coherent foreign
policy directed at one central objective: to preserve American
preeminence. That objective is set out in the famous National
Security Strategy Statement, of September 2002. But one would be
wrong to think that this objective is either new or unique to the Bush
Administration. It was indeed Secretary of State Albright who went
around the world referring to the United States as "the world's one
indispensable nation." It was the Reagan Administration and the
Bush Administration, before the Clinton Administration, that sought
in effect to bury what President Reagan referred to as the "Evil
Empire," recognizing full well, of course, that the consequence would
be American hegemony. Whether it was wise to articulate this
objective as forthrightly as the Bush Administration did in the NSSS
or as Madeline Albright did many times is a separate question, upon
which reasonable people can differ. But it seems to me indisputable
that it is and has been the objective of American policy makers for
some time. It is, moreover, accurate to say that it is the objective of
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other states to expand and preserve what power they have. States
seek to enhance their security by enhancing their power. That is how
the international system works. Sometimes that objective coincides
with the collective interest. But it is not correct that individual
interest and collective interest always coincide, as one prominent
member of the U.N. Blue Ribbon Commission on U.N. Reform has
frequently said. State individual interest and the collective interest
are unfortunately sometimes at odds. And when the individual
interest of the state is at odds with the collective interest, states
choose their own national interest over the collective interest.
An example of what I am talking about is not simply the United
States but France. France has in recent years undertaken a foreign
policy project, which its former Foreign Minister, Hubert Vedrine,
has said is the central objective of French foreign policy-namely, to
return the world to a multi-polar configuration of power. The aim of
French diplomacy over the last several years has been to knock the
United States down a peg. I was in Paris at a symposium a few days
ago where Vedrine was a participant, and he reiterated that objective.
The aim of France, I might add further, is not simply to narrow the
gap between French power and American power, it is to preserve
whatever gap exists between France and third-tier power competitors
such as Poland and Spain. Recall that when ten Eastern European
states had the effrontery to question French opposition to the United
States in the Security Council in the run up to the Iraq War, they
were said by French President Jacques Chirac to be "not well brought
up." It is France's objective to preserve and enhance French power,
and it does this, to the extent that it can do so, by enlisting other
states in the project. This is why China and Russia have been no less
forthright in their willingness to join in pursuing the objective of a
multi-polar world. It is not simply at the United Nations that these
efforts have become visible. The crisis that erupted last December in
the European Union in Brussels, with the collapse of talks on the new
European Constitution, occurred precisely because the French and
Germans were not about to let third-tier power competitors use the
new Constitution to get a leg up on them.
Now, let me be clear. I believe it is entirely appropriate for these
states to seek greater power at the expense of the United States. If
American policy makers were sitting in Paris, Berlin, Moscow or
Beijing, we too would be engaged in precisely the same project that
they are. But, by the same token, it is also entirely appropriate for
the United States to seek to expand and preserve its own power. If
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French policy makers were sitting in Washington, if France sat atop
the world as the preeminent power, it would do precisely the same
thing as the United States is doing today. It is therefore neither
realistic nor desirable to expect the United States voluntarily to
forego its preeminence. Other states would not do so; if the United
States were to do so, chances are great that it would be replaced in
the world by some other locus of power-power not committed to the
ideals to which the United States is committed, and quite possibly
dominated by states which have a long history of oppression. That
development would not be good for the United States, and it would
not be good for the world.
So much for ends. Let me say a word about means. Some would
suggest that the discussion of means to this end of preserving
American power ought to begin with a discussion of the debate about
multilateralism versus unilateralism.
I believe that these two
categories present a false choice, that the debate about unilateralism
versus multilateralism is misdirected.
Multilateralism and
unilateralism are not, as they are often presented to be, oppositional
categories, but rather exist in a kind of symbiotic relationship.
Unilateralism can, in certain circumstances, promote multilateralism.
The exercise of unilateral power can make multilateral institutions
more viable. As an example, consider the exercise of unilateral
power by the United State in the run-up to the Iraq War, when the
United States unilaterally enforced Security Council resolutions
without the Council's authorization-an action that redounded to the
benefit of a multilateral institution, the United Nations.
Unilateralism promoted multilateralism.
Similarly, the use of
multilateral institutions can further the ability of the United States to
act unilaterally by enhancing American power. Multilateralism,
through the use of "coalitions of the willing," can have the effect of
softening the jagged edges of hegemony. Multilateralism can make it
easier for the United States to get its way. The United States,
moreover, has an interest in the creation and maintenance of certain
categories of rules within the international system. Force is not
always the best means of achieving American policy objectives. It is
strategic in certain circumstances to cultivate institutions that will, in
the long term, redound to the net benefit of long term American
interests, even if short term sacrifice is entailed. So it seems to me the
real question is not whether the means chosen by the United States
ought to be multilateral or unilateral. The real question is the extent
to which the United States should subject itself to international
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regimes.
By international regimes I mean organizations and international
rules. Let me talk about those separately. First, organizations. Let
me begin by underscoring the point I just made. The use of
international organizations can advance U.S. national interests.
American national interests are advanced today, for example, by the
special U.N. team that has been dispatched to Iraq by the Secretary
General to help determine whether it is possible to hold an election in
Iraq prior to the transfer of sovereignty, which is scheduled to occur
on June 30. It will be useful for the United States to have an
independent arbiter, such as the United Nations, to tell the Iraqi
people that it is impractical to hold an election before that time, if
that indeed turns out to be the case. I believe the United States, in
fact, should have gone further and invited U.N. weapons inspectors
from the International Atomic Energy Agency into Iraq to be at the
side of the United States in the event that WMDs are discovered.
Why? Because it helps advance American power if the United States
is believed in the event that WMDs are discovered. And there are
many people, not without foundation, who will be suspicious if the
U.S. weapons inspectors claim on their own to have discovered
WMDs in Iraq. So it seems to me mistaken to try, as George Will has
urged, to delegitimize the United Nations. The United Nations and
other international organizations can be effective tools for the United
States to use in pursuing its strategic objectives.
My message, therefore, is simple. The United States should use
international organizations where they are available to advance its
national interest. But it should recognize their limitations. Those
limitations fall essentially in two categories. First, I have already
described one set of limitations-international organizations can be
used as tools by power competitors of the United States to check
American power. That is how France sought to use the Security
Council in the run-up to the Iraq War. In each case, the United
States has to engage in long-term cost/benefit analysis to determine
whether American involvement in an international organization
advances or retards its national interest. In doing so, it needs to avoid
getting unduly reliant upon that organization. It needs to be aware
that it is easy to become habituated to the legitimacy of an
international organization as a condition to acting unilaterally. And
like it or not, it is essential that the United States retain the capacity
to act unilaterally in appropriate circumstances. That is one reason
why, for example, the Bush Administration correctly decided not to
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go to the U.N. Security Council to seek the Council's authority to use
force against Afghanistan following the attacks of September 11.
Recall that in similar circumstances at the time of first Gulf War,
when Iraq attacked Kuwait, the first Bush Administration did go to
the U.N. Security Council, even though an argument could easily
have been made that no Security Council authorization was required.
Under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, Kuwait had every right to act
in self defense, as did the allies that it enlisted. A similar argument
could have been made, and indeed was made, by the United States
with respect to Afghanistan. I believe that the United States made
the correct decision by not going to the Security Council. It is
important not to get locked into a situation in which we are
dependent upon the legitimacy of the United Nations to act.
A second set of limitations of the capacities of international
organizations can be gleaned from the literature of social science on
the subject of cooperation. The question that the literature addresses
is: what conditions are necessary for cooperation to take place?
Cooperation for this purpose is viewed broadly as cooperation among
individuals, cooperation among groups, cooperation between nations.
It is relevant to law because law is a form of cooperation. When the
conditions needed for cooperation are not present, it is much more
difficult for the rule of law to function effectively. The literature I
refer to identifies over a dozen conditions that facilitate cooperation;
these are necessary to permit the effective regulation of a subject
matter by international law. I am not going to run through all of
those conditions today, but I will suggest to you that if one were to
ask whether the conditions necessary for the effective regulation of
force in the world exist today, one would conclude with regret that
those conditions are not present.
Now, some might say, "Ah, this is a bunch of nonsense. All we
need is bold leadership." With bold leaders, dynamic leadersnotwithstanding the fact that the conditions are not present-one
might think that it is possible for a newly spiffed-up international
organization to lead the world into a new Aquarian era of light and
peace and justice. This sentiment cannot readily be dismissed; many
idealists believe it. But I might simply suggest that those of you who
are familiar with the work of the American legal realists will
appreciate why this sentiment ought to be received with some
skepticism. One leading legal realist, Karl Llewellyn, investigated
why some working rules gradually, over time, become paper rules.
His work was carried out long before social scientists had gathered
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the data that they have on conditions necessary for cooperation and
for the operation of an effective rule of law. But the truth is that
Llewellyn was talking about very much the same thing: while bold
leadership can come up with a new scheme that seems at the outset to
be one of sparkling hope, absent the necessary conditions it soon
collapses. And working rules soon become paper ones.
I want to give you, rather than talking abstractly, three examples
of the kinds of conditions that social scientists have suggested are
necessary for legal regulations to work. I want to discuss those
conditions in the specific context of the regulation of force by the
U.N. Security Council.
First, it is necessary to have a consensus on basic values. Imagine
a community in which the question is whether the use of fireworks
should be permitted, and if so when. One half of the community
believes that fireworks should be permitted at night but not during
the day. The other half, vice versa. Can that community agree when
fireworks should be permitted? The answer is of course that no
agreement is possible because no underlying consensus is present.
You can come up with "weasel words" in a city ordinance to the
effect that the use of fireworks are permitted when appropriatewhich is effectively what some of the international instruments do in
regulating the use of force. But ultimately, when these instruments
are tested they will be seen to be have no bite, precisely because there
is no consensus behind them.
That is exactly what exists today in the international community
with respect to the use of force. I started out by talking about
Kosovo. Humanitarian intervention, perhaps more than any other
recent example, illustrates exactly what I am talking about. It has
often been said that Kosovo is an example of a situation in which
there is a new, emerging norm of humanitarian intervention, of which
we should take cognizance. The truth is that the new, emerging norm
exists largely in the minds of the leaders (and perhaps the
populations) of a handful of Western and Northern democracies.
China, India, and Russia all objected to NATO's action in Kosovo.
The states of Africa, South America and Central American objected
to what NATO did in Kosovo. They have been on the short end of
the stick when it comes to intervention, and are not about to sign onto
a new international regime that permits humanitarian interventionperhaps for pretextual purposes-or to reopen a very sorry and
sordid history that they are glad to have behind them.
Following the Kosovo war, Kofi Annan came up with a forward-
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looking proposal. He suggested to the U.N. General Assembly that
intrastate genocide should no longer be shielded by sovereignty-that
when intrastate genocide occurs, as he suggested it did in Kosovo,
outside states should be permitted to intervene to stop it. The
reaction in the General Assembly to Kofi Annan's proposal was
interesting. I went through that debate. It occurred over a period of
about six weeks. Half the members of the General Assembly
responded. Of that half, about one-third supported it, one-third
opposed it, and one-third essentially spoke out of both sides of their
mouths, making it impossible to tell which side they were on. So in
the General Assembly, about one-sixth supported what the Secretary
General was proposing, and one-sixth opposed it-suggesting again
that there just is no consensus today with respect to this fundamental
question of when force should be used.
It is no accident, therefore, that in drafting the statute of the
International Criminal Court (ICC), the Rome Conference listed
aggression as one of the four offenses that is prosecutable before the
ICC, but curiously failed to define aggression. Why did it fail to
define aggression? For the simple reason that there is no consensus
today about what constitutes aggression. The Yugoslavs thought at
the time of the Kosovo war that they were the victims of aggression
and made that argument quite forcibly to the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) in The Hague. Anybody who doubts that there is no
consensus today as to when use of force is permissible ought to take a
very close look at a poll (which is available on the internet) that was
done recently by the German Marshall Foundation. They asked a
half-dozen European countries and the poppulation of the United
State a number of questions concerning the use of force, and the
results were illuminating. They asked this simple question: "Do you
believe it is appropriate to go to war to obtain justice?" Eighty-four
percent of the U.S. respondents agreed that war is sometimes
necessary to obtain justice. In Europe, the percentage was 48%. In
Germany, only 39% of the poll's respondents agreed with that
proposition, and 60% disagreed. Thirty-two percent of the U.S.
respondents had an unfavorable view of the United Nations; only
21% of Europeans did.
Fifty-five percent of the American
respondents thought that the war in Iraq was worth the loss of life
and other costs incident to attacking Iraq; only 25% of Europeans
polled agreed with that proposition. Finally, respondents were asked
to suppose that "North Korea has acquired WMDs and the U.N.
Security Council has decided to attack North Korea to force it to give
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up those weapons." The respondents were asked, "Would you
support a decision by your government to take part in this action?"approved, mind you, by the United Nations. In America, 72% of
respondents said yes; 24% said no. In European only 41% of
respondents said yes; 55% said no. So I suggest to you again that the
evidence is plain-that the necessary consensus for regulating the use
of force by the rule of law is lacking.
That is one of the conditions that the social scientists have
distilled as a condition precedent for the effective regulation of a
subject matter. The second is a relative equality of power. I have
already discussed American unipolarity, but it is worth returning to
this topic, if merely to note the great difficulty that a hegemonic
power poses for the creation of an authentic legal order. Why is that?
Well, for the simple, rather obvious and common-sensical reason that
the strong believe that they do not need the rule of law to preserve or
protect their interests. This is a subject that received a fair amount of
attention in the Federalist Papers. James Madison, in the Federalist
51, asks this very question: why should the powerful in the United
States be expected to honor the rule of law that we are setting out in
this Constitution? And his answer is very curious. He says it is
because of doubt about their future station. He hypothesizes that the
strong will believe that at some point in the future they may no longer
be strong, that they may not be able to rely upon their power to
protect themselves, that they may need the law when their power has
disappeared.
The problem today is, frankly, that the U.S. government has
come to the conclusion-wrongly, I believe-that its power will
continue indefinitely, and that it does not and will not need law to
protect it. In these circumstances, it is extremely difficult to establish
an authentic legal order in which all actors within the system are
subject to the same rules. Hegemony is, in short, at odds with the
fundamental notion of the rule of law, and this is true notwithstanding
the identity of the hegemonic actor. It would be true if France or
Russia or China exercised the preeminent power that the United
States does today.
A third condition, the final condition, that is necessary for the
effective operation of the legal system-for the effective regulation of
a subject matter-is that there be a relative absence of free riders. In
the international system today, in the provision of an important
public good (namely, collective security) there are many free ridersmost specifically in NATO, among American allies who have no
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rational reason to give up their TVs, universal health care systems
and early retirement systems, so long as the United States will deny
itself all of those things to exercise the role of policeman of the world.
The more the United States provides the public good of collective
security by itself, the more it gets locked into a situation in which it is
required to provide that public good, because competitive powers
have a disincentive to expend resources for that same good.
So these are three of the conditions that are needed to make law
work. Absent these conditions, and others like them, international
organizations simply will not work, however well-designed they are.
Tinkering with the architecture will not change things. To add seats
to the Security Council for Brazil or Nigeria or India is to rearrange
deck chairs on the Titanic. The problem is not with the architecture
of the U.N. Security Council. The problem is not with the design of
the Council. The problem is not with the shape of the temple that the
law has constructed. The problem is with the ground on which the
temple is built. And no architectural design is going to stand firmly
on the fractured and fissured ground on which the international
regulation of use of force stands today.
So much for institutions. Let me now turn to the question of
rules. I will suggest to you that a very similar conclusion results. In
the absence of these conditions necessary for the effective operation
of the rule of law, the U.N. collective security system has all but
collapsed. The security system set up by the U.N. Charter is familiar
to most of you. It can be easily summarized and is set out in Article 2,
paragraph 4 and Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. The U.N. Charter
prohibits states from using armed force against other states except in
two circumstances: one, in self defense; and two, where it is
authorized by the U.N. Security Council. There is no exception for
humanitarian intervention. There was a theory behind this very
straight-forward system. It was believed in 1945-across the street,
when the U.N. Charter was drafted-that the Security Council would
exercise a monopoly on the use of armed force and that self-help by
states would be ended. Why? Because the Security Council would
represent, in Winston Churchill's famous words, "a constabulary
power before which the forces of barbarism and atavism would stand
in awe." Well, it was wonderful dream. But, unfortunately, it never
came to be, and for reasons with which we are all familiar. During
the Cold War, the veto exercised by the Soviet Union in the Security
Council precluded the establishment of the standing or stand-by force
within the Security Council to provide the constabulary force that and
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Churchill and Roosevelt and Truman had expected. And the upshot
was that the Security Council never obtained the monopoly on the
use of force that was expected, and states again were compelled to
resort to self-help.
Indeed, since 1945, well over 200 instances have occurred in
which force has been used by states in plain violation of the
proscription of Article 2, paragraph 4. The most recent, obvious
example is perhaps Kosovo, in which force was used by nineteen
Western democracies representing 780 million people. The countries
that took the lead in founding the United Nations bombed
Yugoslavia without any semblance of authorization by the U.N.
Security Council, without any plausible argument that they were
acting in self defense. This is not the only recent example. Madeline
Albright has referred to Africa's "First World War" (which much of
the developed world rather missed), a huge interstate conflict that
occurred in Africa in the 1990s, in which tens of thousands of people
died. Nine African states at one point or another engaged in this
interstate conflict.
One can make one's own judgment as to whether the U.S. use of
force against Iraq complied with did or did not comply with the U.N.
Charter. But it is worth inquiring why the North Koreans have so
insistently asked the Bush Administration to sign a non-aggression
pact with them. Why would North Korea make this request? The
U.N. Charter was intended to be the mother of all non-aggression
pacts. It was intended to end the need for non-aggression pacts. Who
seriously would say to the North Koreans, "Oh, don't worry, you
don't need a non-aggression pact with United States because the U.N.
Charter is there to protect you"?
The unfortunate truth is that the U.N. Charter, in its proscription
against the use of force by states, has gone the way of the KelloggBriand Pact of 1928-the treaty that was signed by every major
belligerent in World War 11-which prohibited the use of force as an
instrument of national policy. Only a few short tragic years later, it
proved to be a set of paper rules rather than working rules. Through
that same process, the use of force provisions of the U.N. Charter also
have tragically turned into paper rules rather than working rules.
What is that process? Let us return for a moment to the
international legal system. Recall that the international legal system
is, in jurisprudential respects, fundamentally different from the
domestic legal order. The international system is a voluntarist
system. States are bound only to those norms to which they consent.
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States are not bound to norms to which they do not consent. States
can express their consent by word or by deed. Yes, they did in 1945
express their consent to the U.N. Charter by signing onto the rule of
Article 2, paragraph 4. But as a scientist looking at this question,
would one conclude today that states still consent to the rule of
Article 2, paragraph 4? We know what words they have used. But
what deeds have occurred since 1945 from which that consent that
might reasonably be inferred? And what additional words have
occurred since 1945 from which that consent, or lack thereof, might
reasonably be inferred?
Now, the answer occasionally is given that the United States and
other states have never explicitly renounced the U.N. Charter or
suggested that they are not bound by Article 2, paragraph 4. And
indeed, in situations such as Iraq, states say they intend to respect
international law. Tony Blair, during the Iraq crisis, said many times
that the United Kingdom would never dream of violating
international law. Similar statements were made during the attack on
Yugoslavia. And from this, some observers conclude that the United
Kingdom and the United States continue to accept the rule,
notwithstanding all of the actual practice that would suggest
otherwise. Well, weigh the practice against the words. Make your
own choice. But let me simply suggest to you that states have no
rational reason to confront other states, as they would be compelled
to do if they explicitly renounced the rule. There are other reasons
that states do not explicitly renounce international rules. In any
event, the United States has never signed onto an "explicit
renunciation" requirement.
Finally, the conclusion that the United States has not renounced
the rule can be reached only by a very selective review of the actual
words spoken by decision makers of states that actually matter, such
as the United States and the United Kingdom Let me draw your
attention to statements made recently by American decision makers.
For each one of these quotes, you can easily come up with a dozen
more in a quick session on LexisNexis. January 27, 2003. Secretary
of State Colin Powell said: "We continue to reserve our sovereign
right to take military action against Iraq alone or in a coalition of the
willing." Our sovereign right to take military action against Iraq? Is
that consistent with the words of the U.N. Charter? In his 2003 State
of the Union Address, President Bush said: "The course of this nation
does not depend on the decisions of others." But the U.N. Charter
has it that the authority of the United States to use armed force
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depends, absent an armed attack (the prerequisite under Article 51 to
use armed force), on the decision of the Security Council. Is the
President's statement consistent with the U.N. Charter? President
Bush, in his 2004 State of the Union Address, said: "America will
never seek a permission slip to defend the security of our country."
Again, the whole point of the U.N. Charter is that unless a state is
subject to an armed attack, under Article 51 it needs the permission
of the Security Council in order to use armed force.
So it seems to me, again, that one has to put all the evidence on
the platter and weigh it all, keeping your eye on the ball. Does the
international community in fact consent, today, to the rule set out in
Article 2, paragraph 4 of the U.N. Charter? The answer, regrettably,
is no. I say regrettably. I lament that conclusion. I think it is an
unspeakable tragedy for humanity that the great legal experiment of
the 20th Century-subjecting the use of force to the rule of lawfailed. But I do not believe that the law is well served by denying that
fact.
Which leads me to my final topic. How should the United States
deal with this world in which the collective security regime of the
charter has collapsed?
First, the United States should recognize that reality. Too many
people in this country, international lawyers in particular, are in
denial. Their heads are buried in the sand. The Secretary General of
the United Nations is not, however. Kofi Annan held a press
conference last year-one of the most extraordinary ever held by the
Secretary General of the United Nations-in which he asked
plaintively, "What are the rules?" The U.N. Secretary General does
not ask that question if the answer is clear, if all you have to do is pick
up some book on international law and look up the rules.
Second, the United States needs to recognize that American
preeminence is not going to last forever. The U.S. economy will not
support it, and the American people are ambivalent about
maintaining American hegemony. Sooner or later, coalitions of
adversaries will form that are likely to coalesce against the United
States, making it increasingly expensive and dangerous to try to
preserve American hegemony. For the United States, therefore,
there is no alternative to the rule of law. And the United States, in
my judgment, ought to use its power today to invest in the
establishment of legal institutions to protect itself when hard military
power will no longer be there to do that.
Third, in setting up these international institutions we have to be
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smart this time and not jump the gun, which means not setting up
international institutions before the necessary conditions are present
to support them. Rather, the United States should work to create the
conditions in which law is possible, in which the regulation of the use
of force is possible. That is a long, slow process, and it means
establishing a situation in which states are willing to accept outcomes
because they have signed onto a pre-agreed process. This is
counterintuitive for many people in the world, who jump immediately
to the question of whether the outcome is one that they like. But a
true commitment to the rule of law means signing onto a process that
sometimes produces outcomes you do not like, because you recognize
that in the long run your interests are served by that process.
Fourth, the United States needs to drop the moralist rhetoric, the
notion that United States acts on the side of the forces of light, that it
is a matter of good versus evil. This type of rhetoric makes
compromise all the more difficult, and makes it all the more difficult
to find the common ground upon which these institutions must
ultimately exist.
Fifth, in the meantime we can console ourselves that this is not the
end of the world. During the 19th Century, there were no legal
institutions to regulate the use of force, and yet the number of battlefield
casualties in Europe was reduced to one-seventh the number of
battlefield casualties in Europe during the 18th Century. Why? Because
a coalition of the willing, known as the Concert of Europe, kept the peace
quite effectively. The point is that there are alternatives to law in
preserving international peace. Kofi Annan, typically, put it well. He
said, in words that international lawyers should heed, "The United
Nations is not an end in itself." There are other ways to achieve the ends
at which the United Nations is directed. And it seems to me incumbent
upon international lawyers in particular, in view of the United Nations'
failure, to look at those alternatives.
Finally, this is most important. The United States today needs to
deal with the world at it is. Not the world as it should be. Not the
world as we would prefer it to exist. Not the world as it might have
been. But the world as it is. Henry Cabot Lodge said: "There is
grave danger in unshared idealism." It is fine to be idealistic, but, in
the world of international relations, one needs to know when that
idealism is not shared.
If we do that, perhaps, someday, we will not need to "get new
lawyers" when we confront a crisis, because our ideals and reality will
finally have come to coincide.

